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Abstract—Anonymity networks are providing practical mech-
anisms to protect its users against censorship by hiding their
identity and information content. The best-known anonymity
network, The Onion Routing (Tor) network, is however subject
to censorship attacks by blocking the public Tor entry routers
and a few secret Tor entry points (bridges), thus preventing
users to access the Tor. To further advance the evolution of
anonymity networks, while addressing censorship attacks, we
propose to enhance the well-known multi-circuit Tor technique
with linear network coding (LNC) and analyze the resulting
censorship success. The results show that LNC can improve the
robustness of Tor against censorship.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Onion Routing (Tor) provides practical mechanisms to
provide user anonymity and thus mitigate censorship. In Tor,
traffic tunneling is provided over a chain of selected onion
routers (OR), which in combination with layered encryption
prevent linking tof communicating parts or decrypting the
information exchanged [1]. Thus, Tor is designed to alleviate
censorship by hiding user’s identity and the content communi-
cated. On the other hand, censorship in Tor is de-facto possible
to implement, the most known example of which is "Great
Firewall of China," where a few major points in the network
are deployed to filter and block the incoming and outgoing
Internet traffic, thus preventing users to connect to Tor.
To mitigate censorship, Tor has introduced bridges, in
form of non-public onion routers that are known to censored
users only and can still allow them an entry into the Tor
network [2]. Nevertheless, a censoring entity can collect the
said bridges and block them as well. To decrease the chances of
blocking, while improving Tor performance and randomizing
the tunnel (circuit) distribution, multipathing in Tor has been
proposed [3]–[6]. Even with multipathing, however, there is
no mechanism as of today to recovering if any of the blocked
circuits or lost traffic in case of censorship.
In this paper, we hope to further contribute to Tor evolution
by improving the defying censorship with multipath routing,
with an addition of Linear Network Coding (LNC). In our
approach, LNC is used in combination with multi-circuit
Tor to recover the traffic blocked by censorship. To evaluate
the benefits of this idea, we define and compare three Tor
implementations: 1) one Tor (oTor), i.e., the traditional Tor im-
plementation with one communication circuit; 2) multi-circuit
Tor (mTor), where traffic transmission is implemented over
multiple Tor circuits and diverse ORs; 3) coded Tor (cTor),
where mTor traffic is encoded with LNC before transmission.
The results show that LNC in cTor can more effectively
mitigate censorship as compared to Tor and mTor.
II. MULTIPLE-CIRCUIT TOR WITH LNC (CTOR)
Fig. 1 illustrates our proposal to implementing LNC in
mTor network (cTor). Just like in oTor, – the basic Tor
architecture, also mTor and cTor include Onion Proxies (OP)
and Onion Routers (OR). Let us assume that OP includes a
client (Alice), who initiates the anonymous communication and
uses information about existing ORs to setup circuits to server
(Bob) over three randomly selected ORs (entry or bridge,
middle and exit ORs). The traffic is split into fixed-sized (512-
byte) units called cells, which are encrypted in layers with keys
of entry, middle and exit ORs so that each OR can remove
only one encryption layer applying the same key as Alice. In
contrast to Tor, where all packets are sent over the same circuit,
a client in mTor and cTor splits incoming traffic m into cells,
builds n traffic sub-flows and sends them through n circuits
toward one exit node. Alice randomly selects 2n + 1 = 9
ORs and setups n = 4 disjoint circuits, which only share a
common exit router. The third circuit contains bridge known
to the censor and will be blocked resulting in cell loss.
The lower part of Fig. 1 shows how Linear Network Coding
(LNC) can be used in the system as erasure code and can
be utilized to protect traffic against losses. Generally, any
(n, k) erasure code encodes k units of original data into n
units of coded data and tolerate lost of up to r = n − k
data units. Thus, Alice splits incoming traffic m into cells
and parallelizes them to build k = 3 cell sub-flows, e.g.,
m1,m2,m3. The encoder takes one cell from each sub-flow
and encodes k cells to generate r = 1 redundant cells, i.e.,
sub-flow m′. We refer to any k cells of original data encoded
together as generation. After encoding, n = k + r coded
cells leave the encoder building n = 4 parallel sub-flows.
Each coded sub-flow is finally encrypted in layers to be sent
over certain circuit toward exit OR. Due to censorship, the
third circuit is interrupted resulting in loss of m3. Circuit
failures and cell losses, however, do not have any impact on the
throughput of cTor as long as at least k = 3 circuits are able
to deliver coded cells to exit node. During decoding process
any k = 3, e.g., m1,m2,m′, out of n = 4 cells from the same
generation can recover the original cells. Finally, the recovered
cells can be serialized into original m and sent to Bob. In
contrast, the circuit blocking in Tor and mTor will result in
communication interruption, since the exit node will be unable
to recover original m due to missing cells and has to request
retransmission.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
03
47
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  8
 Ju
l 2
01
9
Fig. 1. Reference architecture of Tor with multiple circuits and LNC, i.e., cTor.
III. ANALYSIS OF CENSORSHIP SUCCESS AND
EVALUATIONS
We assume that there are Mb unknown bridges and M ′b
bridges known to a censor. The censored user randomly selects
n entry nodes out of Mb +M ′b bridges resulting in
(
Mb+M
′
b
n
)
possible bridge combinations. The censorship is successful, if
the anonymous communication was successfully disrupted by
bridge blocking, i.e., the receiver is not able to recover the
sent information. Blocking of entry ORs, i.e., bridges, results
in blocking of the circuit and loss of whole cell flow sent
over this circuit. In case of the anonymous communication
over Tor and mTor, the communication between client and
server is disturbed, if at least one bridge utilized as entry
OR is known to a censor and blocked. The client randomly
selects n, where n ≥ 1, out of Mb + M ′b available bridges,
whereby the probability to select known to the censor and
blocked bridge, i.e., the probability for a censorship success,
can be calculated as Pbb = 1
(Mb+M
′
b
n )
∑min{n,M ′b}
i=1
(
Mb
n−i
)(
M ′b
i
)
.
Thus, client selects n − i honest and i censored bridges out
of Mb and M ′b, respectively. When LNC is applied (cTor),
the censorship is only successful if more than r out of
n utilized bridges are known to the censor and blocked.
Thus, the destination receives less than k cells from each
generation and can not recover the original information by
decoding, i.e., the probability for successful censorship is
P LNCbb =
1
(Mb+M
′
b
n )
∑min{n,M ′b}
i=r+1
(
Mb
n−i
)(
M ′b
i
)
, M ′b > r.
We now analyze a generic network topology, whereby
any client can select between Mb + M ′b ≥ 25 bridges.
Fig. 2 shows the probability for successful communication
interruption due to blocking of entry bridges, whereby we
assumed that Mb = 25 bridges are unknown to the censor.
The probability of circuit blocking increases with increasing
number of known bridges and utilized circuits n related to Tor
and mTor. The mTor communication over n = 8, 10 circuits
will be blocked with probability 100% when the censor knows
more than 15 bridges. In contrast, cTor shows much better
performance, which depends of the amount of utilized coding
redundancy r, e.g., cTor always outperforms mTor and Tor
if M ′b ≤ 25. The communication over n = 10 and n = 5
circuits with r = 4 and r = 2 redundancy shows the lowest
probability of communication interruption by censorship as
long as M ′b < 15 and 15 ≤M ′b < 25, respectively.
Fig. 2. Probability of successful communication interruption (Pbb
and P LNCbb ).
IV. CONCLUSION
We investigated multi-circuit Tor in combination with LNC
to increase robustness against censorship. The results showed
that cTor with random selection of ORs and circuits carries
potential to significantly improving the robustness of anony-
mous communication against censorship as compared to Tor
and mTor.
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